Whither whistleblower concerns? Air India crash: Govt of India report suggests human error

 

Is the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India, seeking to bail out Boeing in its preliminary report released recently despite the top MNC's whistleblower concerns? It would seem so, if the Ministry's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's (AAIB's) preliminary findings into the catastrophic crash of Air India’s Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner, registration VT-ANB, which went down shortly after takeoff from Ahmedabad on 12 June 2025, killing all 241 on board and 19 on the ground, is any indication.

While the report refrains from assigning any direct blame — in line with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) protocols — its contents strongly suggest that cockpit actions, rather than aircraft or engine failures, were responsible for the accident. However, in light of ongoing concerns raised by whistleblowers about the Boeing 787’s safety and manufacturing integrity, the report may not put all questions to rest.

The report describes how, within seconds of liftoff, both engines shut down after the fuel control switches for Engine 1 and Engine 2 moved from “RUN” to “CUTOFF.” According to the flight data, “Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec.” (p. 14) This loss of thrust during initial climb left the aircraft unable to maintain altitude.

Perhaps the most telling evidence comes from the cockpit voice recorder. As recorded in the report, “one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.” (p. 14) This brief but dramatic exchange suggests an unintentional action in the cockpit — human error — rather than a mechanical or software failure.

The AAIB also notes: “There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB,” and that although the FAA had issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) in 2018 about possible disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature, it was “not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD)” (p. 6). Air India did not act on the SAIB since it was advisory. The report confirms that all Airworthiness Directives and relevant service bulletins had been complied with.

Despite the weight of evidence pointing to cockpit error, there is reason to wonder whether the incident would revive questions about the structural and system integrity of the Boeing 787 — concerns that had previously been raised by two high-profile whistleblowers from within Boeing’s own ranks.

John Barnett (photo), a former quality manager at Boeing’s 787 plant in Charleston, South Carolina, had repeatedly warned of critical production flaws and safety compromises. Barnett testified under oath and to federal regulators that substandard manufacturing practices at the 787 plant included using non-conforming parts, and that he was pressured to overlook safety lapses. He had expressed fears that these flaws could cause in-flight system failures or even catastrophic accidents. Barnett died under mysterious circumstances in March 2024, just days before he was scheduled to give further testimony.

Another whistleblower, Sam Salehpour, a Boeing quality engineer, told a U.S. Senate hearing in April 2024 that shortcuts taken during the assembly of the 787 could lead to structural fatigue, particularly around the fuselage joins, increasing the risk of in-air failure. Salehpour said he faced retaliation and threats for refusing to sign off on work he considered unsafe. Both whistleblowers highlighted systemic issues at Boeing’s production facilities, arguing that the company prioritized speed and profit over safety.

These concerns have gained new urgency in the wake of the Air India crash, even though the AAIB report does not implicate any Boeing system or design flaw. The report explicitly states that “at this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers.” (p. 15) The implication is clear: current evidence does not point to technological or design failure.

Nevertheless, the fact that both engines shut down due to the transition of fuel control switches — a manual action — raises troubling questions. Was the switch design susceptible to inadvertent activation, as the 2018 SAIB had warned? Could crew confusion or inadequate feedback from the cockpit interface have contributed?

The report confirms that the switches were found in the “RUN” position after the crash, indicating the crew had attempted to recover. “Engine 1’s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery… Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration.” (p. 14) But recovery came too late.

While the investigation is ongoing, and the final report will likely provide further analysis, the preliminary report lays emphasis on cockpit behavior without identifying any fault in Boeing’s technology. Yet, the shadow of whistleblower claims and long-standing safety concerns about the Dreamliner program remains. The events of 12 June may have been triggered by human action — but there appears reason to believe why the context in which such actions occurred shouldn't deserve scrutiny.