Caste, class, and Patidar agitation: Veteran academic 'unearths' Gujarat’s social history

Recently, I was talking with a veteran Gujarat-based academic who is the author of several books, including "Social Movements in India: A Review of Literature", "Untouchability in Rural India", "Public Health and Urban Development: The Study of Surat Plague", and "Dalit Identity and Politics", apart from many erudite articles and papers in research and popular journals.

I asked Prof. Ghanshyam Shah why it was that, insofar as my information goes, not much material is available on caste and class issues in Gujarat. Even some of the most well-received books, including "Shaping of Modern Gujarat", authored by Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth and published by Penguin in 2005, if I remember correctly, deal with class and caste issues only peripherally.

There are, of course, a few sociologists, especially Prof. Gaurang Jani, Prof. Vidyut Joshi, and Prof. Shalini Randeria, who have examined caste issues in some detail. However, they too don't  seem to have taken an overall view of caste and class in Gujarat, including their historical context.

Prof. Shah, 86, seemed to agree, stating that this gap does indeed exist, especially with regard to the relationship between caste and class, and he is aware of it. But what he revealed to my utter surprise was that, at this ripe age, he has just finished a book on the class and caste dynamics of Gujarat, dealing with their historical context, and has finalized it for print by a UK-based publishing house.

Even as I said I looked forward to the book—though I must admit this was more out of courtesy, as I am a very bad reader unless it’s for a write-up—Prof. Shah forwarded to me a paper published in "Economic & Political Weekly" (June 22, 2024), as an example. “I have included what I wrote in the paper in the new book as one of the chapters,” he told me.

After waiting for a few days, I decided to go through the paper titled "Neo-liberal Economy and Middle-class Patidar Agitation for Reservations in Gujarat". Running to more than 10,300 words, the paper details the class origin of the Patel—also called Patidar—caste, how it has evolved over the last several centuries, and what lay behind what was perhaps the most powerful agitation by the community after Narendra Modi left Gujarat to become India’s Prime Minister in 2014.

Calling the 2015–16 Patidar agitation in Gujarat a significant shift in caste-based politics in India, the paper claims that historically, Patels are a dominant and economically influential caste that had once opposed reservations, arguing that merit should be the sole criterion for education and employment opportunities. However, according to the paper, with the advent of what it calls "neoliberal economic policies", which led to considerable job insecurity, Patidar youth, particularly from the middle classes, demanded reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. Led by the Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti (PAAS), this movement leveraged the community’s social capital and ultimately secured a 10% reservation under the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) category.

According to Prof. Shah, the Patidar caste's roots can be traced to the Kanbi agricultural community. While several academics, including Prof. Vidyut Joshi, have told me that the Kanbi caste in Gujarat was traditionally classified as Shudra—but not untouchable—in the varna system, as they were tillers, which was considered a productive but lower-ranked occupation in the traditional hierarchy, Prof. Shah’s paper does not delve into this aspect.

Annual per capita income across caste groups (Rs)

I don’t know if the chapter of the about-to-be-published book points this out, but the paper does explain how, over time, Kanbis rose to gain economic and political power in the rigid hierarchical framework. According to Prof. Shah, Mughal and Maratha rulers appointed some locally dominant families or lineages among cultivators as village heads for revenue collection and policing functions, designating them as Patels. In return for their services, they were granted land.

According to him, some of these lineages in central Gujarat designated themselves as Kanbi-Patidar—'pati' meaning strip, and 'dar', holder of land. The British rulers encouraged Kanbis of central and south Gujarat to cultivate forestland and wasteland occupied by subaltern communities to increase agricultural production and meet the needs of the growing textile industry in Europe.

The expansion of agricultural land was so rapid in central Gujarat that by 1857, 80% of the cultivable land in Kheda district had come under the plough. A similar pattern was seen in south Gujarat between 1850 and 1929. In Saurashtra, where Rajputs were the feudal landlords, their lands were tilled by Kanbi-Patidar tenants, who later became beneficiaries of land reforms under the Congress government.

The first real turnaround, notes Prof. Shah, came in the early 20th century when the Patels petitioned the census commission to be designated as Patidar instead of Kanbi, which materialized in 1931. This was followed by diversification of their occupations and improvement in economic conditions, leading their elites to reinvent their origins in the Brahminical caste hierarchy.

The freedom movement gave a boost to the upward social mobility of the Patidars. In the early 20th century, middle-peasant Kanbis participated in the Kheda and Bardoli satyagrahas under the leadership of M.K. Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel, opposing the government’s hike in land revenue. They dominated the freedom struggle and the Congress party in Gujarat.

The economic growth of Patidars continued post-independence, facilitated by land reforms, the Green Revolution, and state policies favouring capitalist agriculture, says Prof. Shah. Many migrated to urban centres, investing in trade, industry, and education. Their economic success led them to perceive themselves as a "progressive" and "hard-working" community.

This gained further momentum as Patidars formed and accumulated modern social capital through caste associations at various levels to support community members in educational and economic spheres. This helped cultivate unity across social divisions of Patidars for mutual support through various caste organisations like the Shree Khodaldham Trust of the Saurashtra Patidars.

As a result, in urban areas, the Patidars came to own nearly one-fifth of all small and micro-factories. In Surat, they came to dominate the diamond cutting and polishing industry, providing employment to more than 10 lakh workers, mostly migrant Patidars from Saurashtra. With trade liberalisation, exports of finished (cut and polished) diamonds increased from Rs 751.1 crore in 1999–2000 to Rs 1,966.7 crore in 2007–08.

However, the small and micro-factories suffered setbacks. The number of sick micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in Gujarat surged from 20,615 in 2012–13 to 49,003 in 2014–15. Additionally, there were frequent crises in the diamond industry, leading to the bankruptcy of units due to a 50% fall in international demand. All this led to unemployment among Patidar workers, many of whom were school dropouts at the primary level.

At the same time, says Prof. Shah, though Patidars—along with other upper castes—had pocketed the largest share of economic growth pre- and post-liberalisation (1991), some sections of OBCs and Dalits also improved their incomes.

Education completed (by caste) in Gujarat, 2011-12

According to the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), the average annual per capita income of Patidars increased from Rs 17,470 to Rs 51,045—an increase of almost 192%—between 2005–06 and 2011–12. At the same time, the per capita income of OBCs also increased from Rs 7,979 to Rs 27,336, an increase of 243% during the same period.

Comments Prof. Shah, a visible increase in the income of a section of lower castes irritated the upwardly mobile Patidars. They perceived "the economic improvement of OBCs and Dalits as a challenge to their social status."

Further, Gujarat witnessed high urban growth in the last six decades, rising from 25% in 1961 to 43% in 2011 as per census figures. However, compared to other states, Gujarat lagged behind in agricultural growth. As a result, the Patidars—60% of whom partly or fully depend on agriculture—suffered. Their agricultural prosperity declined. The proportion of small and marginal Patidar farmers increased from 43% in 1970–71 to 69% in 2004–05, with fluctuations in incomes and rising debts.

Moreover, says Prof. Shah, among the upper castes, Patidars were late entrants in pursuing higher education due to their agricultural occupation. 

In 1960–61, 76% of college students were from upper castes: 26% were Brahmins, 35% Vanias, and 15% Patidars. In the mid-1980s, about 7% of Patidars in rural Gujarat had someone in the family with a college education, as against 19% of Vania and 14% of Brahmin households. In urban areas, the figures were 42% for Patidars compared to 68% for Vania and 63% for Brahmin families.

Some Patidar leaders feel troubled that despite constituting 50% of the forward castes, they were not able to secure a corresponding share of the non-reserved seats in professional courses like medicine and engineering.

Despite this, Patidars—forming about 12% of Gujarat’s population—harboured the feeling that they deserved privileged access to office jobs, given their social status. They resented when OBCs, Dalits, or Adivasis received preference through reservations. Prof. Shah quotes then Chief Minister Anandiben Patel, who said amidst the 2015 Patidar agitation: “Patidars are not interested in becoming constables; everyone wants to become Superintendent of Police… We [the state government] advertised for 8,500 posts for constables, and only 1.5% of those Patidars applied.”

All of this contributed to the Patidar agitation in 2015, as economic insecurity was exacerbated. While the agitation succeeded in securing 10% reservation for economically weaker sections, suggesting how dominant castes can reshape political narratives to address their demands, structural issues like job scarcity and economic inequality persist, concludes Prof. Shah.