In a significant development, the Supreme Court’s Centre for Research and Planning (CRP) has released a comprehensive report examining 75 years of judicial discourse on caste, analysing Constitution Bench judgments from 1950 to 2025. The report, authored by Dr Anurag Bhaskar, Dr Farrah Ahmed, Bhimraj Muthu and Shubham Kumar, highlights how the court’s language has evolved—and at times faltered—in addressing caste, discrimination and affirmative action.The study notes sharp divergences in how benches have historically understood caste. While some judgments have unequivocally recognised caste as a hereditary hierarchy based on purity and pollution, others have described it as originally benign. Quoting Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian's concurring opinion in Indra Sawhney (1992), the report highlights: “The caste system… divides the society into privileged and disabled, revered and despised… The perpetuation of casteism, in the words of Swami Vivekananda, ‘continues social tyranny of ages’.”
Several judgments, the report notes, articulate caste as intrinsically linked to hereditary occupation, a concept repeatedly affirmed by the court. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy’s lead opinion in Indra Sawhney is cited: “In rural India, occupation-caste nexus is true even today… Lowly occupation results not only in low social position but also in poverty… ‘Caste–occupation–poverty’ cycle is thus an ever-present reality.”
In contrast, other judgments traced caste to supposedly benign or functional origins. The report critically cites M.R. Balaji (1963), where Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar observed: “The caste system may have originally begun on occupational or functional basis… its original functional and occupational basis was later over-burdened with ritual concepts… creating feelings of superiority and inferiority.” According to the report, this narrative risks softening the understanding of caste violence and oppression.
On how the judiciary has characterised Dalits and other oppressed castes, the report points to earlier metaphors that today appear paternalistic or demeaning. It reproduces Justice Subba Rao’s illustration in Devadasan (1964): “Take the illustration of a horse race… a handicap may be given… By doing so, what would otherwise have been a farce of a competition would be made a real one.” The authors note that such metaphors frame affirmative action as charity rather than constitutional entitlement.
The study also highlights phrases that suggested caste-based reservations jeopardised administrative standards. In N.M. Thomas (1976), Justice Krishna Iyer wrote: “You can’t… grind the wheels of Government to a halt in the name of ‘harijan welfare’.” The report notes that the term “Harijan” is now considered abusive, and that judicial repetition of such language gave legitimacy to caste-coded prejudices.
At the same time, the report documents progressive shifts in judicial discourse. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy’s influential opinion in Vasanth Kumar (1985) is prominently quoted: “They ask for parity, and not charity… The days of Dronacharya and Ekalavya are over. Several bridges have to be erected, so that they may cross the Rubicon.”
The report also notes decisive judicial acknowledgment of how caste-based discrimination continues despite constitutional guarantees. Quoting Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s 2018 opinion in the Sabarimala case, it states: “Article 17 was a promise to lower castes that they will be free from social oppression. Yet for the marginalized communities, little has changed… Dalits are being killed for growing a moustache… or riding a horse.”
The authors emphasise that the CRP’s purpose is not to critique individual judges but to sensitise the judiciary to how language shapes law. The report states: “The purpose of this publication is to encourage reflection… on how the legal system can advance the constitutional mandate of equality and dignity for all citizens.” It reiterates the CRP's institutional neutrality, noting that no sitting judge’s judgment has been analysed.
By compiling judicial descriptions of caste—from analogies with animals and “crutches” to more empathetic accounts of structural oppression—the report calls for a shift towards terminology rooted in dignity and constitutional morality. It warns that older expressions, when repeated, risk “reinforcing stigma rather than dismantling it.”
The publication is positioned as part of the CRP’s ongoing effort to make the justice system more sensitive to equality concerns, building on earlier handbooks on gender stereotypes, disability rights and administrative terminology. The authors conclude that the judiciary must consciously adopt inclusive, historically informed language, stating that “constitutional transformation requires not only legal reform but also linguistic reform.”
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