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China’s elections, the Soviet experience and the question of democracy

 
The other day, I was not the least surprised to read an article by Tings Chak, editor of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought, published from Beijing. Distributed as a syndicated article by Globetrotter, and republished in Counterview, it originally carried the headline, “China’s Mass Elections and the Politics Beyond the Ballot”.
What prompted me to write this blog was not merely the way Chak seeks to portray the Chinese electoral system, but also how I found his arguments remarkably similar to the manner in which elections were conducted in the Soviet Union before its collapse in 1991. This was something I witnessed with my own eyes during my seven-year stint as a journalist between 1986 and 1993 for Delhi-based semi-Left daily Patriot and Link Newsweekly.
But first, let me quote Chak, who also happens to be the Asia Co-Coordinator of the Beijing-based Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. According to Chak, the Chinese elections currently underway constitute “one of the world’s largest exercises in direct voting”. The process will continue into next year, with “more than one billion eligible voters being called upon to elect over 2.6 million deputies to county and township people’s congresses”, from the capital, Beijing, to the vast countryside.
Chak claims that “the elections are taking place on a scale rarely seen elsewhere, yet this part of China’s political system remains little understood abroad”. He offers the example of a village where preparations for polling were accompanied by “a rural music festival”. There, “elected representatives served freshly ground coffee to local farmers and visitors”, while discussing “the village’s development and encouraging people to register and prepare to vote”.
Among the issues discussed were practical concerns, including access to farms and unlit paths between fields.
Chak then turns to Beijing to describe the same electoral process on a metropolitan scale. “On 6 November, the capital set up 13,054 polling stations to choose 4,898 district deputies and 11,137 township deputies. Voting took place in residential communities, workplaces, university campuses, and state institutions, including Zhongnanhai, where President Xi Jinping cast his ballot.”
Stating that the system extends across a country with 503,000 administrative villages and 112,000 urban communities, Chak describes it as a people's congress system operating at five levels. Citizens elect deputies to county or urban district congresses and township congresses for five-year terms. These congresses, in turn, elect representatives to the congresses of cities, provinces and the National People's Congress (NPC). Each higher-level congress is elected indirectly by the congresses one level below. The process, he says, will eventually lead to a new national legislature in 2028.
But how are those seeking election nominated? Here, the picture becomes clearer. Chak says that candidates may belong to the Communist Party of China (CPC) or any of China's eight other political parties. However, he acknowledges that these parties “operate within the political system under CPC leadership” when it comes to nominating candidates. Moreover, this so-called “whole-process people's democracy” operates within a system in which “the CPC's leadership is established in the Constitution”.
Dissent in China
While I have no direct knowledge of how elections are conducted in China, it does not require any extraordinary effort to establish that dissent is not tolerated there. The historic crackdown at Tiananmen Square in Beijing may have receded into the background, but sources tell me that there has been a well-documented resurgence of interest in Mao Zedong among young Chinese. This is said to be driven by economic slowdown, youth unemployment, workplace stress and wealth inequality. At the same time, online censorship is reportedly targeted at expressions of this sentiment when they cross into political criticism or nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution.
According to these accounts, the Gen Z turn towards Mao has largely taken place through reading groups, university libraries, e-commerce platforms and social media. At Tsinghua University, Selected Works of Mao Zedong reportedly topped library loan lists, while online shops on Taobao sold tens of thousands of Mao-themed enamel mugs and other memorabilia.
Young people confronting intense competition, stagnant wages and long working hours under the so-called 996 work culture frequently quote Mao's writings on class struggle and opposition to exploitation to criticise modern corporate capitalism and widening wealth disparities.
The CPC officially reveres Mao as the founder of the People's Republic of China. However, Beijing remains wary of grassroots Maoism because it can easily develop into criticism of the party's present market-oriented policies and growing inequality. Censors reportedly delete viral content that uses Mao-era themes to suggest that China's post-1978 economic reforms abandoned the principle of working-class equality.
For instance, in December 2025, a multi-hour video commentary on the film Fang Hua (Youth) reportedly went viral on Bilibili, attracting more than 10 million views. It presented the Cultural Revolution as a more equitable path than the Reform and Opening Up era. The video was subsequently removed by censors at the height of its popularity.
The authorities are also deeply wary of students translating Maoist theory into actual labour activism. One of the most prominent crackdowns on young Maoists took place in 2018–19, when police detained dozens of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist university students, including members of Peking University's Marxist Society, who had travelled to Shenzhen to support factory workers seeking to organise unions. Since then, the authorities have maintained tight control over campus Marxist clubs and suppressed offline organising before it can develop into demonstrations.
I may not have first-hand information about democracy in China, but the way algorithms operate in Chinese AI applications offers some indication of how wary the authorities are of anything that might remotely appear critical of the country. Otherwise quite responsive and useful for checking facts and grammar, three AI applications I have used routinely give me the following response whenever I make a reference to China: “Sorry, I cannot provide this information. Please feel free to ask another question.”
Be that as it may, it would not be out of place to draw a parallel between what I witnessed in the former Soviet Union and what might be happening in China today, whether in the conduct of elections in the name of democracy or in the suppression of dissent.
Iron Curtain
Let me begin with the extent of the Iron Curtain that I personally experienced, not just in Moscow but in other parts of the Soviet Union as well.
A five-year-old boy lived in the neighbourhood of our apartment, situated less than three kilometres from Red Square in Moscow. He met our two-year-old daughter in the open area downstairs, and his mother told us that he would love to play with her. We readily agreed. Every other day, he would visit our flat. Sometimes, he would even make lovely little toys to give her.
The boy seemed remarkably knowledgeable. He knew English, as his mother was an English teacher, and would talk about leading Russian literary figures such as Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev and Chekhov. One day, he surprised us by telling us that the renowned physicist Andrei Sakharov, a leading dissident and Nobel laureate, lived across the small Yauza River that passed by our apartment building. From our window, he pointed out the building where Sakharov lived and even identified the floor. I later confirmed that he was right.
One day, the boy stayed back a little longer than usual. His mother came knocking at our door to take him home. She scolded him for spending so much time at a foreigner's house. That was the last time he visited us.
A few weeks later, I met his mother downstairs and asked her why the boy was no longer coming. Her reply was revealing: “We don't want any trouble. We are Jews. We want to go to Israel. So excuse us, we had better avoid any interaction with foreigners.”
Another incident involved an engineer whom we had been asked to contact to get our new Philips television, purchased in West Berlin, converted to the Soviet broadcasting system, from PAL to SECAM, so that it could receive local channels.
He asked us to meet him at a metro station to hand over the television, which we did. He agreed to deliver the repaired set to our residence. A week later, he arrived at our apartment. Noticing that he had not brought the television, I wondered what had happened.
“The TV is in my car. I have parked it across the Yauza River. I just came here to ensure that there aren't any surveillance devices,” he explained.
I told him that ours was a Russian apartment and not part of a foreigners' enclave. Satisfied, he went back and brought the television to our residence.
I found the engineer an interesting person and subsequently invited him and his wife for lunch. We prepared Indian food. While we were talking, he suddenly asked me to unplug the telephone so that he could express his views freely. I wondered why.
“You never know. They might have secretly installed listening devices. Better to be safe,” he said.
I did as he asked, making him comfortable enough to speak freely with us.
Elsewhere, too, I encountered similar situations. I travelled extensively across the Soviet Union. Fascinated by V.I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet regime, I particularly wanted to visit places in eastern Siberia where Lenin had been imprisoned and exiled.
As a foreign journalist, I was required to inform the Soviet Foreign Office at least 24 hours before leaving Moscow about my destination, the dates of my travel, where I would stay and the places I intended to visit. During one such trip to eastern Siberia, a representative of the Soviet propaganda agency Novosti accompanied me to help with arrangements.
I was taken to a museum of Buddhism to showcase the country's supposedly extensive freedom of religion. There, using the little Russian I had picked up, I asked the museum official questions about the persecution of Buddhists.
Someone standing nearby overheard me and began explaining what had happened. He even got into our car to provide more details. A few minutes later, as he was describing the brutal suppression of Buddhists under the Soviet regime, the Novosti representative asked him to get out of the car.
Turning to me, he said, “This is not what you are here for.” I was immediately whisked away in the car to another destination.
In another incident, during a visit to the small Caucasian republic of Dagestan, I met the well-known poet Rasul Gamzatov. A war veteran, I had read his poetry and was particularly impressed by his couplets. I wanted to interview him.
Tens of people had gathered at the venue where the interview had been arranged, primarily to listen to what Gamzatov had to say.
One of my questions was whether he believed there was anything called Soviet poetry. It was a controversial question because Communist ideologues maintained that a new literary genre, called socialist realism, had developed, one that glorified socialism and communism. In the Soviet Union, the expression “Soviet poetry” or “Soviet literature” was commonly used, often obscuring the language in which a literary work had actually been created.
Gamzatov was frank in his response.
“No, there is nothing called Soviet poetry. There is Russian poetry, Avar poetry (Avar being the language of Dagestan), Ukrainian poetry, and so on. A poem always reflects the local milieu and belongs to the place where you live, not to the entire country,” he declared.
The interview was published, and Novosti, which had arranged the meeting, was terribly upset.
“Our purpose has not been served. You asked Gamzatov the wrong question. Whatever he said in response has been published even in the local media in Dagestan. This has damaged us,” I was told.
Soviet Elections
Coming to elections in the Soviet Union, I did not investigate the subject extensively at the time. However, I recall an interesting interaction with Masood Ali Khan, the Moscow correspondent of New Age, the CPI's publication, whom I would meet from time to time.
The year was 1988, and polling was taking place. I casually asked him what he thought about the elections. His response was revealing:
“They have all been asked to vote. As always, there will be 99 per cent polling, and 99 per cent of the votes will go to the one and only Communist or Communist-nominated candidate.”
I later learnt that under Soviet electoral law, amended in 1977, voting was officially defined as a voluntary right rather than a legal obligation. There were no fines or criminal penalties for failing to cast a ballot.
In practice, however, the Communist Party employed considerable social, workplace and administrative pressure to ensure near-100 per cent turnout, routinely reporting figures of 99.9 per cent or higher.
The voting procedure itself was revealing. To vote for the candidate, an elector simply took the printed ballot paper and dropped it into the ballot box without marking it. To vote against the candidate, however, the voter had to enter a private booth and cross out the candidate's name. This effectively made the act of dissent visible to election observers.
Things began to change after Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Communist Party and the government. His political reforms, known as perestroika and glasnost, transformed the electoral system by introducing genuine competition.
In March–April 1989, the Soviet Union held its first partially free, multi-candidate national elections since 1917. Of the 2,250 seats in the newly created Congress of People's Deputies, 1,500 were contested in territorial and national districts, many involving multiple candidates, while 750 were reserved for the Communist Party and officially recognised public organisations.
Several prominent Communist Party officials lost their seats, while reformists, including Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Sakharov, were elected. They subsequently used live televised parliamentary sessions to openly criticise the government.
In 1990, competitive elections were held for the parliaments of the 15 Soviet republics without reserved seats for the Communist Party. Pro-independence and nationalist movements won majorities in the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as in Georgia, Armenia and Moldova. Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Russian parliament.
Chinese System
China's electoral system, at least on the face of it, appears to resemble the pre-Gorbachev Soviet electoral system. 
In China, too, citizens are not legally required to cast a ballot, and there are no legal penalties or fines for abstaining.
However, the electoral process has certain distinct rules and practical dynamics concerning voter registration and participation.
Local election committees are legally required to register all eligible citizens aged 18 and above, unless they have been legally deprived of political rights, on the electoral rolls before an election. Citizens do not need to opt in to be registered.
Although there is no legal penalty for not voting, official turnout figures in grassroots elections, such as those for county, township and village bodies, are typically reported to be very high, often exceeding 90 per cent.
This is largely attributed to active mobilisation by local neighbourhood committees (juweihui), village committees, state-owned enterprises, universities and government workplaces, which strongly encourage or organise employees and residents to participate in voting.
I do not want to make a prediction, but I keep wondering whether the Communist Party's tight grip on the electoral system could one day collapse, as it did in the Soviet Union.
I personally witnessed how, by 1991, people, including members of the armed forces, had grown increasingly opposed to the lack of democracy in the country.
In August 1991, Communist Party hardliners attempted to seize control of the Soviet Union from Gorbachev in a coup d'état that lasted from August 19 to 21.
On the very first day, soon after the coup was announced in the morning, I had to take my wife to hospital, as she was expecting our second child. Accompanied by our six-year-old daughter, we boarded the metro, one of the best in the world. We found the passengers tight-lipped and deeply concerned. Nobody was talking.
About two hours later, when we returned by the same metro line, the mood had changed. People were already smiling, although there was still some anxiety.
We decided to get off near Red Square. What we encountered was almost festive. Tanks were stationed all over the square, but the soldiers manning them had placed olive branches in their mouths.
A passerby approached us. Noticing the bindi on our daughter's forehead, a couple came up to us, asked whether we were from India and wanted to photograph her. They placed her on a tank and took a photograph, smiling, while a Russian soldier happily stood by.
I concluded then and there that the coup would not last long. And that is precisely what happened: it collapsed within three days.
What happened subsequently is well known. The totalitarian system collapsed like a house of cards, even though the person who had initiated the process of political reform, Gorbachev, was eventually pushed to the sidelines.
Modi's Samras Move
As a postscript, I am reminded of what Narendra Modi attempted as Gujarat Chief Minister. In 2001, after becoming Chief Minister, he introduced the Samras concept to encourage unanimous, uncontested village elections. Subsequently, his government sought to give legal sanction to compulsory voting through the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Bill, introduced in 2009.
Under the Samras scheme, the state government offered special financial development grants to Gram Panchayats that elected their Sarpanch (village head) and all ward members unanimously, through consensus, thereby avoiding contested polling altogether.
Villages that avoided elections received additional government development grants, ranging from ₹3 lakh to ₹13 lakh, depending on their population and whether they achieved Samras status repeatedly.
The compulsory voting Bill sought to make it legally mandatory for all registered voters in elections to village panchayats, taluka panchayats, district panchayats, municipalities and municipal corporations to vote.
Registered voters who failed to cast their ballots without valid exemptions, such as illness or being away from their place of residence, were to be declared “defaulters” by the election authorities. The state government also proposed rules providing for a fine of ₹100 for non-voters.
The Bill faced years of delay because the then Governor, Kamla Beniwal, withheld her assent and returned it twice, in 2010 and 2011. Her objections centred on the argument that forcing citizens to vote could violate Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression and, according to this interpretation, includes the freedom to abstain from voting.
After Modi became Prime Minister in 2014, the new Governor, O.P. Kohli, gave his assent to the Bill in November that year. The Gujarat government subsequently notified the compulsory voting rules in July 2015, ahead of local body elections.
However, in August 2015, the Gujarat High Court stayed the implementation of the compulsory voting provisions following a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The court observed, prima facie, that the right to vote inherently included the right to refrain from voting.
Consequently, compulsory voting was never enforced in Gujarat.
I do not want to believe that India could one day slip into a Chinese- or Soviet-style electoral system. Yet, there are clearly traits in India that indicate an admiration for certain aspects of the Chinese and Soviet models of governance.
The attack on dissent is already well documented. Could a similar electoral pattern follow?
I have no answer.

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