Beyond Indus water treaty suspension: A 'nationalist' push despite harsh climate realities

The suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) appears to have pushed the middle classes, at least in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's home state, Gujarat, further towards what the powers-that-be would consider—a "positive" direction. As usual, during my morning walk, I tried talking with a neighbour about what impact it would have. Ignoring what is widely considered a "security lapse," this person, who had just returned after buying milk, compared the Modi move with Trump.

I was a little surprised. How? I asked him. "People call Trump mad," he said, "Maybe he is. But let me tell you: Trump's tariff is in the country's national interest. Like Trump, you can also call Modi mad. But his Indus move is very much in India's national interest." I asked him whether it would be feasible for Modi to stop Indus water, or waters of other western rivers, Chenab and Jhelum—which under the treaty are also allocated to Pakistan—from crossing the borders.

The gentleman smiled and said, "I don't know whether it is possible for Modi to work out ways to stop Indus and other river waters from flowing down to Pakistan. What I learn from the media is, it would mean creating a huge infrastructure to make it possible. Some even say it's nearly impossible. However, this is not important. I don't think Modi will militarily attack Pakistan. But the Indus move would put Pakistan constantly under pressure. It's already showing signs of nervousness."

Pointing out that Pahalgam has already given Modi the required fillip, especially against the backdrop of Bihar polls, which the BJP-Janata Dal (U) combine would have otherwise lost, he said, "See how even Muslims are supporting the Modi move. They know if they oppose, it would put them in trouble. Even the opposition, for the first time, has lent its support to Modi—this has happened for the first time in the last one decade."

As I was talking with him, I was reminded of my Gujarat Sachivalaya days when I was posted as the Times of India representative in Gandhinagar. Way back in May 2002, Modi, as Gujarat Chief Minister, pleaded with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee for providing a share of water to the drought-prone state from Indus under IWT. A Gujarat Cabinet meeting approved the move, stating it was the right of "barren Kutch and Banaskantha to get Indus water."

A special cell under the chairmanship of the Chief Engineer of the Water Resources Department was even set up to "strengthen" Gujarat's claim over the Indus river, insisting that if the two arid districts received water from a canal in Pakistan, it would convert them into "green fields." As per IWT, it was claimed, Kutch had been considered a part of the Sindhu-Indus basin. I never heard of this special cell thereafter. 

Modi repeated this stance often—going so far as to insist on linking Indus waters with the Narmada grid. He said the Narmada project could be extended up to Indus at Sardar Chowki near the Indo-Pakistan border by laying a pipeline and a "sangam" could be created. "I have submitted a plan to the defence ministry to share the cost of linking the Indus water at Sardar Chowki on the Kutch border with the Narmada water grid," he said.

At yet another point, Modi urged the Union government to "check" the water flowing down the dam across Indus in Pakistan towards the Rann of Kutch and divert its surplus water into the landmass in the semi-arid Kutch. The subsurface Indus water from the Indus was "going waste" into the sea, he contended, adding that Indus thousands of years ago helped maritime activities in the now parched lands of Gujarat. 

Meanwhile, already there is demand from Kutch asking Modi to "honour" what he had committed years ago. One keen X user wonders, "Where can Indus water be diverted after suspension of IWT? In 2002, Gujarat CM Narendra Modi raised Kutch’s demand for Indus River water at the National Water Resources Council, urging the Centre to do justice—in the presence of PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee."

Adds this user, "Today, 23 years later, with the Indus Water Treaty suspended after the Pahalgam terror attack, the people of Kutch are reminding PM Modi: it’s time. Time to honour the commitment. Time to deliver water to the parched lands of Kutch. Time to assert India’s stand and give Pakistan a fitting message. Time for PM Modi to fulfil his own demand..." 

Beyond the "popular view" on IWT suspension, raising what are supposedly nationalist sentiments, policy and environment experts have insisted that there is a "yawning gap between threat and reality."

Thus, top policy analyst Mohan Guruswamy, in an article in Deccan Herald, which he reproduced on Facebook, recalls that after the Uri incident, Modi had said, “Blood and water cannot flow together,” commenting, "The truth is that the flow of blood can be stopped, but water will continue to flow."

Believes Guruswamy, "The geography makes it next to impossible to stop the flow of waters from the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum," though admitting, there has been reason "to revisit this treaty, because of Pakistan’s persistent misuse of the provisions of the IWT that enable it to adopt a dog-in-the-manger attitude to prevent or delay any development of hydel projects on the three rivers that is permitted by the treaty... This will now stop."

The policy analyst says, on the face of it, the World Bank-brokered Indus treaty, signed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan in Karachi on September 19, 1960, appears generous to Pakistan, as it gives the lower riparian state 80% of the water of the western rivers. "But the reality is that IWT makes a virtue of a necessity, as it is the geography of the region that decides this rather than any Indian altruism."

According to him, "The main Kashmir valley is just a hundred kms wide at its maximum and 15,520.30 km² in area. While the Himalayas divide the Kashmir valley from Ladakh, the Pir Panjal range, which encloses the valley from the west and the south, separates it from the great plains of northern India. This picturesque and densely settled valley has an average height of 1,850 metres above sea level but the surrounding Pir Panjal range has an average elevation of 5,000 metres."

"Thus," states Guruswamy, "the Pir Panjal range stands between the Kashmir valley and the rest of the country and is an insurmountable barrier that precludes the transfer of water anywhere else. And neither do the contours of the Kashmir valley allow for more waters to be stored in any part of it. Since the waters cannot be stored or used by diversion elsewhere, it has to keep flowing into Pakistan." Chenab and Jhelum face similar realities.

He quotes Dr Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, head of the earth sciences at the geology and geophysics department, University of Kashmir, as saying: “Let us assume we stop the water supply for the sake of argument. Where would the water go? We do not have infrastructure to store this water. We have not built dams in J&K where we can store the water. And being a mountainous state, unlike Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state. So you cannot stop the water technically.”

Notes Guruswamy, "But even if it can be done, climate change is upon us with severe implicit consequences for both countries, but mostly for Pakistan. The Indus river basin is fed mostly by glacier melt, unlike the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins, which are fed mostly by the monsoons. Since climate change is now affecting the Himalayan glaciers, the water patterns in the Indus river basin are already showing changes. Hence Pakistan constantly keeps up a drumbeat of false charges about the non-adherence to the IWT by India."

He adds, based on current projections, the Indus river system is expected to fall below 2000 flow levels between 2030 and 2050. The drop-off is estimated to be most serious between 2030 and 2040, with a new equilibrium flow of 20 percent below that of 2000 reached after 2060. Not only is Pakistan running out of water, it seems to be running out of time soon. 

Meanwhile, top environment expert Parineeta Dandekar, in a detailed piece on a site dedicated to water-related issues, has warned that amidst the IWT suspension, the more immediate crisis already ravaging the Indus basin is climate change. This has been overlooked. Already, it has claimed lives, displaced communities, and disrupted livelihoods on both sides of the border through recurring disasters and shifting hydrology, particularly in the Chenab basin. 

Basing on fieldwork in October-November 2024 across the Chenab basin, community interviews, government reports, and scientific studies, the expert says there are concerns related to climate change impacts, water security, hydropower development, and governance, and there is reason to question the wisdom of pursuing more dams in this vulnerable region.

She notes, as a western river with the most hydropower projects in India, Chenab is critical. Here, hastily advancing dam construction, bypassing essential studies, ignoring local protests, and overlooking disaster risks would prove perilous.

The expert, in her article with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar, states, the Chenab river, formed by the Chandra and Bhaga rivers in Lahaul and Spiti, Himachal Pradesh, is allocated to Pakistan under IWT, with India allowed limited consumptive and unlimited non-consumptive use. 

The basin’s glaciers, vital for water security, are retreating rapidly. Studies estimate a 33.3% reduction in glacial volume from 1960 to 2005. With 50% of Chenab’s flow at Akhnoor derived from meltwater, this loss threatens both nations. Glacial melt supports 60% of irrigation in the Indus basin, making glacier health critical. 

She notes that, as a western river with the most hydropower projects in India, the Chenab is critical. However, hastily advancing dam construction—bypassing essential studies, ignoring local protests, and overlooking disaster risks—would prove perilous.

The expert, in her article with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar, highlights that the Chenab River, formed by the Chandra and Bhaga rivers in Lahaul and Spiti, Himachal Pradesh, is allocated to Pakistan under the IWT, with India allowed limited consumptive and unlimited non-consumptive use. The basin’s glaciers, vital for water security, are retreating rapidly: studies estimate a 33.3% reduction in glacial volume between 1960 and 2005. With 50% of Chenab’s flow at Akhnoor derived from meltwater, this loss directly threatens both India and Pakistan. Glacial melt supports around 60% of irrigation in the entire Indus Basin.

She details specific vulnerabilities:

• Bhaga River, originating near Surajtal Lake, hosts 306 glaciers storing approximately 15 billion tons of water. Between 1971 and 2020, glacier areas shrank significantly, with deglaciation rates doubling (0.25% per year). Rising temperatures (+1.14°C between 1961–2015) and declining precipitation since the 1990s have accelerated ice loss. Small glaciers (<1 km²) are at risk of extinction.
• A 2018 glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) near Zingzingbar and frequent floods and landslides underline the region’s vulnerability.
• The proposed 300 MW Gyspa Hydropower Project, which would submerge 1,260 hectares and four villages, faces strong local opposition.
• The Chandra Basin, covering 2,440 km² with 200 glaciers, has seen a 33% projected ice volume loss by the 2050s, with low-altitude glaciers potentially losing up to 97% of their volume by 2100.
• Samudra Tapu Lake expanded 905% between 1965 and 2022 (from 14.19 ha to 142.69 ha). A full breach could release 17,342 m³/s, threatening settlements and the planned 126 MW Chhatru Hydropower Project.
• Bara Shigri Glacier, the largest in Himachal Pradesh, lost 4 km² over the last century, with a 650-meter snout retreat recorded between 1977 and 1995. Over 60 supraglacial lakes on the glacier increase the risk of GLOFs.
• Ghepan Gath Glacier and Lake expanded 178% (from 36.49 ha to 101.30 ha) between 1989 and 2022, threatening Sissu village.

In villages like Tandi and Tholang, drying springs and reduced snowfall have forced communities to rely on river-based lift irrigation, escalating upstream-downstream conflicts. Over 70% of residents surveyed in Lahaul-Spiti reported dried water sources and increasingly extreme weather events.

Despite these risks, three large hydropower projects—104 MW Tandi, 130 MW Rashil, and 175 MW Bardang—are proposed between Tandi and Udaipur. Strong local protests, led by groups like the Save Lahaul Spiti Society, highlight fears of climate disasters, loss of fertile land, and unstable nallahs like Jahlma causing landslides.

Other threatened areas include:

• Miyar Nallah, with 156 glacial lakes and 120 glaciers, facing devastating floods in 2013, 2014, 2017, 2023, and 2024. The 120 MW Miyar Hydropower Project, cleared in 2012, sparked controversy due to ignored GLOF risks.
• Pangi Valley, where a cascade of projects near Kadu Nallah threatens settlements with an expanding glacial lake formed around 2010.
• In Jammu and Kashmir’s Chenab Basin, Mundiksar Lake in Kishtwar expanded 150% between 1980 and 2020, posing risks to major downstream hydropower projects like Bursar and Pakal Dul.

Recent floods near the Baglihar Hydropower Project further highlight the urgency of reconsidering development plans in this fragile landscape, says Dandekar.

She concludes that India's preparedness for glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) remains inadequate, with minimal studies or governance frameworks addressing the hydropower-climate risk nexus. She insists that given the Chenab basin’s seismic activity, high disaster vulnerability, and projected climate impacts, rigorous, transparent, and community-centric planning must take precedence over geopolitical or economic motives.