Amid a communally charged atmosphere, I personally witnessed how Modi, during the elections, turned the then-powerful campaign against him—for "instigating" the February 2002 anti-minority riots in Gujarat—into an advantage, calling it an "assault on Gujarat gaurav (pride)." As the Times of India representative, I visited a few places to observe his strong pitch about this supposed attack on Gujarat’s pride, which included targeting "Mian Musharraf" to draw a contrast between himself and an "external" Muslim adversary, thereby positioning himself as a defender of Gujarat’s honor.
A couple of my colleagues traveled across Gujarat, trailing Modi wherever he campaigned. The pre-poll phrase "Ham paanch, hamare pachees" ("we five, our twenty-five")—a satirical reference to the stereotype that Muslim men have multiple wives and numerous children—drew widespread criticism for perpetuating negative stereotypes about Muslims. A related remark by Modi referred to the scores of relief camps set up for Muslims displaced during the 2002 riots. He controversially described them as “children-producing centres,” questioning whether it was time to shut them down.
Guruswamy references the "ham paanch, hamare pachees" phrase to highlight how many Hindus view the relatively higher Muslim population growth rate as "threatening." Citing official figures, he notes that Muslims have had a higher birth rate than Hindus, resulting in the percentage of Muslims in India rising from about 9.91% in 1951 to 13.45% in 2001, and to 14.2% in 2011. While the 2021 census was not conducted, estimates suggest the Muslim population has now reached 14.6%.
Even as he debunks the RSS-supported narrative—often repeated on social media and by Hindutva-leaning media—that Muslims will soon outnumber Hindus ("given present trends, it will take Muslims many centuries to gain parity with Hindus"), Guruswamy proposes that religion plays a role in the higher fertility rates among Muslims. He cites surveys indicating that 33.4% of Hindus consider two children ideal, compared to 20.7% of Muslims.
He quotes The Causes of Demographic Change by Johan and Pat Caldwell, and PH Reddy, which states: “Muslims regard the family planning programme as a creation of the Hindu state and, frequently asserting that sterilization is opposed to Quranic law, they say they adhere to the morality of the Book, rather than to changing political morality.”
He also refers to Islamic scholar Abu Hamid M. al-Ghazali in Ihya, Ulum al-Din, who reasons: “Despite the prophetic exhortation to multiply, it is nevertheless permissible for a Muslim to remain single. The effect of remaining single on multiplying is no different than the effect of practicing al-azl. Since one is permitted, it follows that the other, without more, is also permitted.” Guruswamy underscores that while the "jeer hamare pachees" may be exaggerated, there is some basis, however irrational, for the fear many Hindus feel about being swamped by Muslims.
Indeed, in terms of polygynous marriages (where a man has more than one wife), the National Family Health Survey-5 (NFHS-5), conducted in 2019–20, states that the prevalence among Muslims is 1.9%, compared to 1.3% among Hindus.
Further, data from 2021–22 show a notable disparity in labour force participation rates (LFPR) between Hindu and Muslim women. Hindu women have an LFPR of 26.1%, while it is just 15% among Muslim women—the lowest among major religious communities. Studies attribute this to traditional gender roles discouraging women's employment, along with lower education levels, and concerns about safety and mobility.
Guruswamy argues that the higher birth rate among Muslims, long linked to economic backwardness, "might have a religious cause also"—a claim supported not only by older data but also by recent official figures. Refuting the view that Muslims' economic conditions are the primary driver of larger families, he asserts: “Religion seems to be shaping notions about family size and the responsibility to bear children.”
According to NFHS-5 estimates, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) among poor Muslim women was 2.6 children per woman, compared to 2.2 children per Hindu woman.
Yet, the fact is, NFHS-5 shows that Muslims' TFR declined from 4.4 in 1992–93 to 2.3 in 2019–21. For Hindus, the TFR dropped from 3.3 to 1.94 in the same period. This suggests that, although religion may contribute to higher birth rates among Muslim women, the fertility gap between Muslims and Hindus has narrowed from 1.1 children in 1992 to 0.42 children in 2019–21.
That poverty and backwardness, despite religion, primarily drive higher fertility among Muslims is further evidenced by trends in Muslim-majority countries. Afghanistan leads with 4.8 births per woman, followed by Yemen (4.6), Iraq (3.4), Pakistan (3.3), and Tajikistan (3.1)—all countries facing limited access to education and healthcare.
Conversely, nations where fertility rates have declined due to improved education, urbanization, and family planning initiatives include Algeria (2.8), Egypt (2.8), Indonesia (2.3), Saudi Arabia (2.3), and Malaysia (2.0). Some countries now have fertility rates at or below replacement level due to higher education, economic progress, and effective family planning—such as Iran (1.7), Turkey (1.5), and Bangladesh (1.7).
Ironically, Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, has one of the country’s lowest TFRs. As per NFHS-5, the TFR in Jammu and Kashmir has dropped to 1.4—below the replacement level of 2.1. This rate is among the lowest in India and is comparable to that of developed countries like Japan.
While NFHS-5 does not provide religion-based data for the state, Muslim women in the Kashmir Valley had a TFR of 3.88 in 2011!
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Very informed log Rajiv Shah