Britain backed ‘Kashmir-in-Pakistan’ for strategic gains, reveals new ICPS paper

 

A new paper published by the Indian Council of Political Studies (ICPS) presents fresh evidence to argue that Britain deliberately shaped the partition of India and Kashmir’s fate to advance its own imperial interests. Titled “Partition by Design: ‘Kashmir-in-Pakistan’ in the British Strategic Chessboard”, the detailed account by Amit Krishankant Paul reveals a concerted British effort in 1947 to create Pakistan as a pro-Western Islamic buffer state aligned against the Soviet Union — with Kashmir envisioned as part of that strategy.

“The paper challenges conventional narratives around partition and exposes how British priorities in Palestine, the Cold War, and imperial military logistics dictated their approach to South Asia,” said Paul.

Quoting from official documents and personal communications of key British figures, the paper demonstrates how Winston Churchill described Pakistan as “the keystone of the strategic arch of the Indian Ocean” and part of a broader Islamic arc — stretching from Turkey to the Indian subcontinent — to contain Soviet ambitions.

It details how top British military and administrative officials — including Mountbatten, Auchinleck, Messervy, Cunningham and William Brown — played “interventionist roles” in ensuring Kashmir’s eventual accession to Pakistan, or at the very least, retaining strategic regions like Gilgit under pro-British control.

“If you accede to Pakistan… it will not cause any ill feeling but they will give you all the support and help they can,” Mountbatten told the Maharaja of Kashmir, as per the paper. He later confessed, “I wanted Kashmir to join Pakistan… I didn’t want to muck up my own creation.”

Among the most striking revelations is the role of the British in the rebellion of the Gilgit Scouts. Major William Brown, a British officer, handed over Gilgit to Pakistan in November 1947 and was later awarded the MBE by His Majesty’s Government for this move. The paper concludes this was no accident, but a strategic manoeuvre aligned with British interests.

The author notes, “British actions in Kashmir and Gilgit during this phase were not simply remnants of a decolonizing empire but reflected a well-orchestrated plan to engineer outcomes that would preserve its post-imperial strategic architecture.”

Drawing from a wide range of sources, the paper contends that Britain’s bias toward Pakistan stemmed not only from the loyalty of Muslim soldiers during World War II but also from realpolitik — access to bases, ports, and overflight rights in Pakistan were seen as essential to Britain's influence in the Indian Ocean and the wider Muslim world.

The ICPS publication adds to a growing body of scholarship seeking to reassess the role of external powers in the subcontinent’s partition, and in shaping the Kashmir conflict — not as a bilateral India-Pakistan issue alone, but as a geopolitical legacy rooted in Cold War alignments.